Risk of Visitor Network Penetration into Corporate Office Networks & Protection Obligations Under MPS Order No.176: Abnormal Traffic Monitoring over All-Optical Networks

Campus cybersecurity risks do not always manifest as system outages or network shutdowns. An office network may appear to operate normally, while covert abnormal connections, internal network scanning and unauthorised access are already underway. Without timely detection, threats can spread from a single visitor terminal to office PCs, internal servers and business systems.

MPS Order No.176, Measures for Cyberspace Security Supervisory Inspection by Public Security Organs, has taken effect on October 1, 2026. Enterprises are required to prioritise cybersecurity defence, retention of user registration and internet logs, and rectification of security vulnerabilities. Campus network construction should not only focus on device online status and internet accessibility, but also establish a complete security workflow covering network segmentation, anomaly detection and emergency response.

Leveraging all-optical networking and integrated security capabilities, AINOPOL builds a defence-in-depth framework across five layers: physical environment, communication network, regional boundary, computing environment and management centre, to strengthen campus cybersecurity governance.

I. Security Risks When Visitor Networks Can Penetrate Office Networks

1. Inadequate segmentation allows unauthorised access to internal resources

Many campuses deploy independent visitor Wi-Fi, but separate SSIDs do not equal effective underlying isolation. Improper VLAN configuration or over-permissive cross-segment access policies enable visitor terminals to probe office computers, file servers, printers and internal business platforms.

Terminals compromised by vulnerabilities or malware may initiate suspicious communications after connecting. Without clear restrictions on the visitor network’s access scope, enterprises leave open doors for unauthorised intrusion.

2. Real-name authentication does not guarantee safe terminal behaviour

Real-name authentication verifies the identity of connecting users, yet it cannot constrain malicious activities after access. A visitor device launching continuous scans across internal IP ranges, probing non-service ports or flooding internal servers with connection requests are all critical warning signs.

If the campus only logs successful authentication events without traffic monitoring and alerting, a blind spot emerges: user identities are traceable, but malicious behaviours remain unseen.

3. Over-reliance on perimeter firewalls leaves gaps in internal risk coverage

Firewalls control inbound and outbound traffic at the internet border, but campus threats are not limited to external attacks. Internal endpoints infected with malware, illegally replaced IoT devices and misconfigured access privileges can also trigger security incidents.

Enterprises must combine perimeter defence, endpoint protection, link segmentation, log management and abnormal traffic monitoring. Multi-layer safeguards reduce the blast radius if any single control fails.

II. AINOPOL All-Optical Network: Five-Layer Coordinated Defence-in-Depth Architecture

1. Physical & Environmental Layer: Secure underlying infrastructure

Server rooms, cabling and network hardware form the foundation of campus connectivity. Poor physical controls expose devices to unauthorised tampering and cable sabotage.
AINOPOL integrates server room access control, video surveillance and fibre tapping detection to harden physical infrastructure. Combined with inherent advantages of optical transmission, this layer provides reliable support for upper-layer networks and services.

2. Communication Network Layer: Secure transmission via all-optical technologies

Office data, surveillance streams and production traffic often share the same campus network. Without proper segmentation, cross-data leakage and service interference become likely.
AINOPOL applies native PON encryption and hard slicing to protect data in transit, while service isolation mitigates mutual interference between different network domains. For visitor networks, dedicated security zones are defined with strict access restrictions blocking access to office and production subnets.

3. Regional Boundary Layer: Deploy M1 Dream Gateway to reinforce border controls

Clear access boundaries must be enforced between different network zones. The AINOPOL M1 Dream Gateway consolidates Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and Web Application Firewall (WAF). It enforces granular access policies and detects/blocks attack attempts according to deployment requirements.

In campus scenarios, access rules are tailored for visitor, office and business domains to block unnecessary cross-segment communication. WAF capabilities protect public-facing web services and mitigate application-layer attacks.

4. Computing Environment Layer: Protect endpoints and business systems

Secure perimeters do not eliminate risks inside the trusted zone. Unpatched servers, virus-infected office hosts and misassigned user privileges can become propagation vectors for attackers.
Enterprises shall enforce identity-based access control, anti-malware protection, patch management and operation auditing. For dumb terminals such as cameras, access controllers and printers that cannot host traditional security agents, AINOPOL implements terminal whitelisting, port binding and permission restrictions to block rogue devices.

Once scanning behaviour or suspicious connections are detected on an endpoint, administrators can trace the device identity and audit trails, then apply containment actions such as access restriction, terminal isolation and security inspection according to risk severity.

5. Management Centre Layer: Centralised orchestration via EAAS Cloud Management Platform

When network devices, endpoints and security policies are managed separately, operation teams struggle to grasp the full risk landscape and correlate evidence during incidents.
The AINOPOL EAAS unified cloud platform centralises network status monitoring, log aggregation and security event management, enabling risk visualisation and coordinated policy response. Standardised workflows for alert verification, event logging and rectification review greatly accelerate anomaly investigation.

Effective abnormal traffic monitoring is more than spotting traffic spikes. It identifies the threat source, impact scope and response priority. Baseline rules must be tuned to business characteristics to reduce false positives from legitimate service flows.

Built on an all-optical foundation with audio-video transmission and embedded security, AINOPOL’s “Communication-Security Integrated” solution delivers customised upgrades covering visitor segmentation, abnormal traffic monitoring, terminal admission control, threat defence and log auditing. For existing campuses, we first map the network topology and access relationships, then roll out phased optimisations for weak points to minimise reconstruction costs.

Important note: Deploying security appliances alone cannot satisfy all compliance obligations. Enterprises shall also formalise security management systems, log retention rules, incident response procedures and vulnerability remediation workflows. Only through the synergy of all-optical infrastructure, layered technical controls and daily governance can campus networks maintain stable performance while gaining robust threat detection and response capacity.

FAQ

Q: Beyond segmentation, what technical requirements does MPS Order No.176 impose on visitor networks?
A: Article 7 mandates technical safeguards against computer viruses, network attacks and intrusions. Segmentation is the baseline requirement, while “prevention” includes the capability to detect probing attempts. If the visitor subnet can scan the office subnet without alerts or audit records, the control is merely passive isolation and may be deemed incomplete during remote inspections.

Q: VLANs have been created for visitor and office networks; why is this insufficient?
A: VLANs isolate broadcast domains, yet coarse ACL rules (default allowlist or only a small set of blocked ports) still let visitor terminals scan office subnets over SMB, RDP and other ports. All-optical micro-segmentation enforces default deny at the security domain level above VLANs. Cross-domain access requires continuous identity verification, so isolation does not rely on the accuracy of a single ACL entry.

Q: What exactly can abnormal traffic monitoring detect?
A: Comparing real-time traffic against normal baselines, the system identifies internal network scans, port probing, non-standard protocol communications, mass ICMP echo requests and unauthorised access targeting internal subnets. Alerts carry complete attack fingerprints including start time, duration, target range and source terminal ID, traceable down to the exact access port and authenticated user account.